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Standard philosophical methodology which proceeds by appeal to intuitions acces-
sible “from the armchair” has come under criticism on the basis of empirical work
indicating unanticipated variability of such intuitions. Loose constitutivity—the
idea that intuitions are partly, but not strictly, constitutive of the concepts that ap-
pear in them—oers an interesting line of response to this empirical challenge. On
a loose constitutivist view, it is unlikely that our intuitions are incorrect across the
board, since they partly x the facts in question. Butwe argue that this ratication of
intuitions is at best rough and generic, and can only do the requiredmethodological
work if it operates in conjunction with some sort of further criteria of theory selec-
tion. We consider two that we nd in the literature: naturalness (BrianWeatherson,
borrowing from Lewis) and charity (Henry Jackman, borrowing from Davidson).
At the end of the day, neither provides the armchair philosopher complete shelter
from extra-armchair inquiry.
Keywords: experimental philosophy, armchair philosophy, intuitions, constitutivity,
semantics, conceptual analysis
1. e Experimental Restrictionist Challenge
e perennial debate about the standing of the method of intuitions (aka
armchair philosophy)1 in philosophy took a turn for the empirical in the last
decade, as a number of self-described “experimental philosophers” reported
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1 Just how far armchairs extend is amatter of some recent contention; see (Williamson 2008)
and (Nolan 2009). For the argumentative purposes here, we will grant that the armchair
may contain in its epistemic ambit a moderate amount of non-specialist empirical knowl-
edge.
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experimental ndings which, they claim, should cast doubt on the overall
trustworthiness of that method.2 is position has elsewhere (Alexander
and Weinberg 2007, 61) been termed the “restrictionist” program in exper-
imental philosophy, and we will follow that usage here; and we will refer to
the central argument of these philosophers as “the experimental restriction-
ist challenge”, or simply “the challenge”. Our interest here is in canvassing
one possible line of response to the challenge. In order to do so, we will
begin by devoting this introductory section to a brief articulation of the di-
alectical structure of that challenge.
e experimental restrictionist challenge, as we understand it, has three
main moving parts. First, there are the experimental results themselves,
which are purported to indicate that the intuitions of their subject popu-
lation is worrisomely sensitive to such factors as ethnicity, aective content,
or order of presentation (see, for example, Weinberg et al. 2001, Nichols and
Knobe 2007, and Swain et al. 2008). Second, while the method that the re-
strictionists want to restrict is that of professional philosophers, nonethe-
less the experimental studies have thus far been conducted almost entirely
on untrained or relatively untrained undergraduates and random persons-
waiting-for-a-bus.e challenge thus requires a further claim that there is a
relevant similarity between the experimental subjects on the one hand and
philosophers on the other, sucient to license an ampliative inference from
the population studied to the population ultimately targeted.ird, experi-
mental restrictionists require the sensitivities that they experimentally doc-
ument to be philosophically problematic—the dierences in intuitionsmust
be ones that lead away from the relevant philosophical truths, and not sim-
ply track them. (For example, intuitions attributing knowledge to a given
agent are likely to be sensitive to the quality of the evidence possessed by the
agent. Surely this would not be a problematic sensitivity for such intuitions
to have!)
If they have all three pieces in place, then the experimental restrictionists
do seem to have the makings of a substantive challenge to the philosophers’
method of intuitions: they have evidence that the intuitions of the philoso-
phers themselves may well be problematically sensitive to factors that will
lead them away from the truths they aim for. ose looking to defend the
armchair may thus want to respond to one or more of those pieces.
2 For overviews, see (Alexander and Weinberg 2007) and the papers cited therein; and
(Knobe and Nichols 2008) and the papers contained therein.
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1.1 Responses to the Challenge
If the restrictionist challenge is successful, then armchair philosophy looks
to be in signicant trouble, displaying unanticipated liabilities to error. How-
ever, before consigning their armchairs to the ames (alongwithHume’s vol-
umes of sophistry and illusions), defenders of the armchair will want to can-
vass all their options thoroughly. In principle, three broad classes of response
to the restrictionist challenge are available that would enable the challenge to
be avoided, corresponding to each of the three parts of the challenge. How-
ever, neither the rst nor the second parts of that challenge can be success-
fully countered from the armchair. Responding to the experimental results
and their interpretation is clearly a scientically substantive project. And it
turns out that the question of who can be expected to have expertise about
what and under what circumstances is a pretty ticklish empirical question.
And even if some sorts of philosophical expertise may be expected unprob-
lematically, such as the expertise of historians of philosophy regarding the
views and arguments of their preferred philosophers, nonetheless whether
or not philosophers are expert intuiters is in particular something that would
require some substantial empirical investigation to discern.3
us those who would pursue a strictly armchair response to the chal-
lenge are le with door number three: that the putative variation in philo-
sophical intuition need not be deleterious, because such variation does not
diverge unmanageably from the philosophical truths. Resistance of this kind
has manifested itself in a variety of ways. Ernest Sosa (2006) and Timo-
thy Williamson (2008) have each suggested that as long as we deploy intu-
itions carefully all will be well; a pious but not particularly practical sug-
gestion, since precisely what is at stake here is whether philosophers actu-
ally know how to be careful in the requisite way. At a minimum such an
approach is hostage to an, as yet undeveloped, substantive account of the
underlying competence in question. Other theorists, such as Bealer (see for
example Bealer 1999), have suggested that good or genuine intuitions bear
some phenomenological mark that careful investigation can identify. But
there is a great deal of high-level disagreement about the existence of such
phenomenology, with such prominent authors—and would-be deployers of
intuitions—asWilliamson (2004, 117), Sosa (2009, 54), and Goldman (2007,
11) denying it in their own cases. (And, for what it may be worth, the authors
of this paper cannot even agree between the two of them as to the exact na-
ture of the phenomenology of intuitions!) is general dissensus indicates
that even if any such mark of “real” intuitions exists, it is not yet something
that can be put to good intersubjective methodological use.
3 See (Weinberg et al. forthcoming).
180 Loose Constitutivity and Armchair Philosophy
What these two forms of resistance share is the view that the appropri-
ate form of modication to current philosophical practice is one where we
appeal to some armchair-available resources—such as intellectual care or
phenomenology—to separate the good intuitions from the bad. And they
all suer from the same problem, namely, that it does not turn out to be that
easy to tell, from the armchair, just which intuitions are wheat and which
ones are cha. We do not pretend to have oered any sustained argument
against such approaches here, but we do note that they face a particular kind
of burden, one with both theoretical and methodological dimensions. e
theoretical challenge is to nd a sign of the trustworthy intuitions, and the
methodological one to nd a way for us to make use of that sign from the
armchair. What is particularly challenging is meeting both burdens at once.
We highlight this double-edged burden in order to motivate an entirely
dierent way of approaching the challenge.is alternative reverses the di-
rection of the relation between philosophical intuitions and philosophical
truths. Rather than treating intuitions as more-or-less good sources of evi-
dence about some intuition-independent philosophical truths, this alterna-
tive approach construes the intuitions as in part constitutive of the relevant
truths. On this account what one of our terms means is not, in general,
something that can come totally unstuck from our use of that term, and as
such, how we would apply or withhold the term across a range of hypo-
thetical cases may be better viewed not as claims about how the term might
apply in those situations, but as constraints on any account of that term’s
meaning. Such a reconguration of the relationship between intuitions and
the relevant truths can become attractive once we see certain problems that
can aict the evidentialist view. For if intuitions are supposed to track the
truths, then the question arises: how is it that such a tracking relation is
maintained?4 And the experimental restrictionist challenge raises the worry
that that relation is, in fact, not maintained. But the constitutivist response
seems to foreclose on the possibility of any radical breakdown of that con-
nection. It is hard tomiss when you rst wait to see where the dart goes, and
then draw a bullseye around it. If intuitions constitute the class of things
to which a philosophical theory must be true, it follows straight away that
those intuitions cannot be faulty in the way that the restrictionist challenge
suggests. If intuitions are not faulty—are necessarily not faulty—then there
is no reason to worry about the eectiveness of the armchair methodology
driven by those intuitions.
is type of constitutivist response to the restrictionist challenge, how-
ever, comes at a cost. If intuitions are both strictly constitutive and various
4 Posing this question is a central concern of (Goldman 2007), and it motivates his rejecting
intuition as a source of evidence for extra-mental reality.
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(as indicated by the experimental ndings), then there must be a similar
variety of philosophical concepts. For example those who disagree about
the attribution of knowledge in a Gettier case must thereby mean dierent
things by ‘know’. In short, a strict constitutivism guarantees the accuracy
of intuitions at the cost of considerable additional complexity in our philo-
sophical theories. Instead of a single account of knowledge, reference, etc.,
we will have several, indeed perhaps a great many. And, more to the point
here, a completed epistemology would thus depend on the contingent mat-
ter of who has which intuitions—not a question that can be answered from
one’s own armchair.
1.2 A Better Response: Loose Constitutivity
Althoughone could perhaps choose to embrace the extreme relativism there-
by entailed, an attractive alternative is to develop a variety of constitutivism
that does not require that every individual’s intuitions are singularly and
denitively constitutive. Such a viewmight be consistent with both the vari-
ety of philosophical intuitions and there being nonetheless a single concept
under consideration. Call this a “loose constitutivism”, to be contrasted with
the “strict constitutivism” that we are suggesting is unpalatably relativistic.
Such an account can be found in the work of Brian Weatherson (2003, 10),
who points out an additional benet of avoiding strict constitutivism: we
thereby would avoid the odd state of aairs in which we turn out infallible
about our own conceptual maps.
Weatherson develops an account of the role of intuitions in philosophi-
cal theorizingwith the primary explicit aimofmitigating the force of counter-
examples in epistemological theorizing in order to make such theorizing
more tenable. As a result using Weatherson’s work in the context of the
empirical restrictionist challenge constitutes a substantive redeployment, or
perhaps an exaptation of Weatherson’s work, for Weatherson’s goal does not
explicitly include a defense of the armchair against the restrictionist chal-
lenge. Nonetheless, he does seem interested in defending something very
much like current philosophical practice, so we hope we are not making
much of a distortion of his views by utilizing them in this way, but we want
to emphasize that at least some of the criticisms that we will be develop-
ing here may still be entirely consistent with Weatherson’s main arguments
and goals. With that disclaimer in place, in the balance of this section we
will set out a Weathersonian account of loose constitutivity with reference
toWeatherson’s own example concerning Gettier cases and the JTB account
of knowledge.
Recall the situation the loose constitutivist confronts. Intuitions on some
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topic of philosophical interest are constitutive of the concept5 but they also
vary in a variety of ways. How could such a collection pick out a single prop-
erty? e trick is to consider which, among all the properties that at least
roughly answer to the set of intuitions, are the most natural ones. Given
some collection of intuitions, what they all refer to is the particular prop-
erty that best balances between maximizing closeness to the collection, and
metaphysical naturalness.is framework oers the promise of accommo-
dating the diversity and instability of intuitions within a single philosophi-
cal theory, because dierent sets of intuitions might all nonetheless be max-
imally close to the same natural property. e referent property must be
one whose extension the intuitions do a more-or-less good job of mapping,
and this gives the theory its constitutivist element. However, the referent
property can also get arbitrarily far away from any one intuition, or any suf-
ciently small and/or unsystematic subset of intuitions, so long as that loss
is compensated by a commensurate increase in naturalness, and this factor
allows the theory to be only loosely constitutivist.
e basicWeathersonian strategy clearly depends onhaving at least some
sort of answer to the question: what makes a property natural? Character-
izing (in the sense of providing a clear example of the kind) the notion is
pretty straightforward, though a denition has proved elusive; on this topic
Weatherson (2003, 11) refers us to Lewis, who in turn switches between treat-
ing ‘naturalness’ as primitive and oering accounts of the term that are suf-
ciently challenging to be the subject of substantial on-going exegesis (e.g.,
Lewis 1983, 1984, 1992, 2001).e general “feel” of the notion is oen cashed
out in terms of the notion of ‘carving nature at its joints’, and it is some-
thing that the property green has a fair amount of, though not as much as
electron, and vastly more than grue. Natural properties mark o objective
resemblances in the world, and are the sort of things appropriate to gure
in inferences that require projectible predicates. ough this is a far from
precise characterization, it is perhaps enough to let us begin to canvass how
it might begin to serve the role needed in a loose constitutivist approach to
armchair philosophy.
Consider the various mostly-overlapping patterns of intuitions that dif-
ferent people might have about what cases fall under the concept KNOWS.
Loose constitutivists would need to ask themselves how such sets of intu-
itions map onto the landscape of properties and the varying degrees of nat-
uralness of those properties. Anumber of outcomes are possible in principle.
5 Weatherson frames his discussionmore as amatter of assigning properties as themeanings
of terms in a language, but we do not think that anything in our discussion here will turn
on the distinction between concepts, and terms in a language, or indeed any other similar
way of carving up this territory.
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It could be the case that there is simply no natural property in the vicinity of
any of these clusters of intuitions, inwhich case it will turn out that KNOWS-
thoughts are non-referring for members of that community. Alternatively, it
may be the case that there are a number of equally-maximally-natural prop-
erties in the vicinity. Should that occur, then it might be that this particular
pattern will lock onto one such property, whereas another, only slightly dif-
ferent pattern might lock onto another. In this case it could turn out that the
diversity of intuitions argued for by experimental philosophers would reveal
that there are distinct knowledge concepts out there. A third possibility, the
one preferred by Weatherson and the one which makes loose constitutivity
so attractive as a response to the restrictionist challenge, is that there will be
a single maximally natural property in the vicinity of all of these clusters of
intuitions, and that will therefore be the property picked out by the relevant
sets of intuitions.
2. Troubles for the Natural Armchair
Let us grant, for the sake of exploring the promise here oered by loose con-
stitutivity, that it is this possibility of convergent reference that obtains. We
now face two methodological questions, if we wish as philosophers to un-
cover what property it is that is the shared referent. First, how do we decide,
for some case that is a matter of particular theoretical concern or otherwise
contested, whether it itself really is a case of knowledge or not? We can-
not simply trust our intuition about the case and let that be the end of the
story, for the kind of validation of our intuitions that loose constitutivity
provides is both rough and generic.e validation is rough, in that we know
at most that any given intuition is somewhat likely to be true, but there is
no intuition that is guaranteed true. And it is generic, as it applies to all of
the intuitions equally. We have no useful suggestions as to how, within the
framework of loose constitutivity, we can extract a more precise degree of
validation for our intuitions themselves. If intuitions carried with them any
sort of phenomenological or other indication of their degree of divergence
from the natural, then of course we would have a way of weighting our in-
tuitions accordingly. But that is just the wheat-from-cha problem that we
were hoping loose constitutivity would allow us to avoid having to confront.
Of course, if we could indentify the correct theory of knowledge then
we could resolve the status of particular cases.6 Achieving that identica-
tion constitutes the second methodological challenge for loose constitutiv-
6 Note that this increased reliance on philosophical t is, in its way, a feature and not a bug of
loose constitutivity. Part of whatWeatherson is looking to do is pry philosophical practice
away from what he sees as an over-reliance on counterexamples.
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ity. For each set of intuitions we may nd a philosophical theory jostling for
acceptance that maps it precisely. But this brings us to our second method-
ological question: how do we tell which of these competitor theories is the
correct one?e constitutivitymove just tells us that none of themwill likely
be radically wrong, but it does not by itself tell us which one is actually right.
Somethingmore is needed to take us from candidates assembled by intuition
to the unique winner of the relevant philosophical debate. Given that we
want a theory of knowledge that will select among the various contenders,
how do we go about choosing it?
2.1 Detecting the Natural
Weatheron’s version of loose constitutivity has further resources for making
use of intuitions, as roughly and generically ratied as they are. So far, the
only candidate armchair-deployable methodological resources that we have
considered are the individual philosopher’s intuitions about cases themselves.
But suppose that we could also tell from the armchair which, among candi-
date sets of competitor analyses, is the most natural? And suppose further
that our armchair epistemic purview included how to make trade-os be-
tween t of intuitions and degree of naturalness, in selecting between such
competitors? Under such suppositions, we might have ready-to-armchair
all the tools we would need to select a best theory.
We contend that only if the following two signicant claims are true,
then we may be able generally to recover philosophers’ intuitive practices.
e rst is a metaphysical claim, about the relation between more and less
fundamentally natural properties:
Constructability (C) Philosophically important properties are natural in
virtue of their location in a matrix of relations to
other, more natural properties.
If (C) holds, then the philosopher analyzing some concept can seek out
the more natural properties that underwrite the naturalness of the property
that concept picks out, and in virtue of which, presumably, we are able to rec-
ognize such properties (e.g. knowledge) in the real and hypothetical cases
where they obtain. e more natural the construct, the better the theory.
Weatherson suggests that theories involving comparatively short construc-
tions of fairly natural properties are thus to be preferred over other theories
(Weatherson 2003, 8–9).
For any of the above to be of methodological import, though, a further
claim needs to be made:
Detectability (D) For any two competitor analyses C1 and C2 for a philo-
sophically important property, we can discern from the
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armchair which is the more natural.
(C) tells us that an analysis is possible, but we need (D) to render it likely
that we can tell easily enough from our armchairs, without special scientic
investigation or anything like that, how dierent proposed analyses rate in
terms of their naturalness. (D) would be clearly true were we to have some
access to some canonical list of the natural properties. Sadly though, we
have no such list. So (D) will as a matter of fact require some other way of
distinguishing the natural from the unnatural—or, more typically, themore-
or-less natural from the just-plain-less natural.
So, (C) and (D) together would enable philosophers to infer from a pat-
tern of intuitions involving a concept to a theory that captures how that con-
cept is situated in the constellation of the natural.
e reader will perhaps not be surprised that our intention here is make
trouble for both (C) and (D).7 Wewill raise doubts about both seriatim, and
then raise a further concern that even if (C) were true, it would likely thereby
make it likely that (D) is false.
2.2 Contra (D)
Here is what the question at hand is not: can we ever tell, comparing two
conceptual matrices, which one picks out the more natural property? We
probably do have at least some general sense for such comparisons; if we
had no such ability whatsoever, Lewis’ and Weatherson’s discussions would
not even have gotten o the ground. And surely everyone not suering from
a t of Goodmania can agree that green is oodles more natural than grue, if
anything is. But what philosophers are going to need, if loose constitutivity
is to have armchair-preserving methodological consequences, is something
rather more demanding. Reect on the theories of knowledge that episte-
mologists are looking for help in choosing between. We claim that it is not at
all manifest to this rough-and-ready sense of the natural just which of track-
ing; safety; justication and truth; justication and truth and some further
anti-Gettier-condition; etc. is most natural. Even if we can sometimes just
plain see which of two constructs is more natural, this task far outstrips that
capacity. If (D) is to hold true here, we will need something more to ap-
peal to than just our most basic sense of naturalness.at basic sense fails,
so to speak, to measure naturalness out to as many signicant digits as the
theoretical task demands.
7 Let us be clear—our goal here is not to problematize naturalness itself but rather its ability
to do a very particular philosophical job; that of underwriting something like the current
philosophical practice of armchair analysis.
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So let us survey what available materials might possibly be adverted to,
in addressing a question of comparative naturalness. One can divide the rel-
evant naturalness-conferring aspects of a property into inherited, structural,
and holistic factors. Inherited factors are those that it receives simply from its
relation to the other properties that are congured in the matrix of its anal-
ysis. For example, one might feel that a property cannot be more natural
than the least natural property it is congured in terms of. Structural factors
derive from the structure of the locatingmatrix. For example, overall logical
complexity may generally be inversely correlated with naturalness. Finally,
holistic factors are those that apply only to the property as a whole, and not
in virtue of the character of itsmatrix. For example, theremaywell be laws at
higher levels than fundamental physics. If that is so, then a complex matrix
may congure a property that gures in such laws, and it would attain some
amount of naturalness in virtue of that nomicity. Suppose there were laws
about red apples that did not derive from the laws pertaining to red things
and to apples more generally; and suppose there were no such laws about
green apples; and suppose that red and green are equally natural. en red
applewould bemore natural than green apple, even though the inherited and
structural determinants of their respective naturalness would be equivalent.
Given these factors, we can see how various sorts of more ne-grained
comparative naturalness judgments would be possible: cases where all the
possible factors except one are equivalent, and where furthermore there is a
clear dierence in the remaining factor. Just for the sake of illustration, the
following seem to us to be plausible pairwise naturalness judgments, though
we certainly do not take ourselves to be committed to them being right: has
a charge of +1emay bemore natural than has a charge of +1 coulomb, because
e (the fundamental charge) is itself a more natural unit than is the coulomb.
Moreover, has a charge of +1emay bemore natural than has a charge of +1e or
+3e, because the latter has greater structural complexity. And, even assum-
ing that 44 and 43 are equally natural, has a nucleus with a charge of +44emay
count as more natural than has a nucleus with a charge of +43e, even though
all their parts are equally natural and they are structurally identical, because
technetium (which, it is our understanding, only occurs synthetically) may
count as less natural than ruthenium (which occurs, well, naturally).
Unfortunately, it is rare for the armchair philosopher to be comparing
two so closely matched concepts. For example, as noted above, justied true
belief and true belief produced by a reliable mechanism are just not obvi-
ously comparable by means of these resources. Nor is true belief produced
by a mechanism operating in accord with its proper function. And so on.
Again, even granting thesemore rened pairwise evaluations of naturalness,
inmany of the places where we would actually like to be able tomake a com-
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parative naturalness judgment, our powers to do so simply pull up short.
And it gets worse; the state of the art just does not tell us how to make
careful trade-os between these various factors. Aer all, grue isn’t just sup-
posed to be less natural than green—it’s supposed to be less natural than al-
most anything else at all. Yet grue is a very simple construct from a small
handful of fairly natural properties. (Even more so if one considers the
commonly-mistaken variant, green before time t or blue aerwards, drop-
ping out Goodman’s original formulation involving observation. Our gut
sense is that this is only marginally more natural than grue, if at all.) e
analyst may of course attempt to nd other factors to appeal to, and it would
be a fascinating project to devise a plausible scheme for quantifying the vari-
ous factors and weighing them against each other. But such methodological
resources are not presently at hand in philosophical practice.
Finally, it seems that many cases of the holistic naturalness of a property
will simply be invisible from the armchair. Our elemental example above is
such a case. If many properties are ones whose degree of naturalness cannot
be discerned from the armchair, then this entiremethodological gambitmay
fail. Indeed, as we shall now argue, holistic naturalness poses a fundamental
problem to using theWeatherson/Lewis framework to defend the armchair.
2.3 Contra (C)
(C) claims that the naturalness of any non-fundamental philosophical prop-
erty is derived from its conguration in terms of other, still more natural
properties. For (C) to be false, then, would mean that some natural prop-
erties that are notmaximally natural properties, nonetheless are themselves
primitively natural; their naturalness is not inherited from the naturalness
of some properties that are in turn more natural than they are. at is, for
(C) to be false, theremust be philosophically-relevant properties which have
a high degree of holistic naturalness. We acknowledge that, assuming that
at least some minimal sort of supervenience holds, there will be interesting
questions about how that property is related to arrangements of the world
specied in terms of more fundamental properties. But our most impor-
tant theorizing of such a property would have to look more like our theories
of fundamental natural properties—more in terms of its relations to other
properties at its own level, less in terms of relations to lower-level properties.
(Of course, theories of the most fundamental properties will have exactly no
features cashed out in terms of relations to lower-level properties.)
e existence of such properties as the would-be targets of philosophical
analyses, ones that mark irreducible resemblances, would falsify (C). But do
we have any reason to think that there are any such properties? Arguments
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from the special sciences literature provide just such a reason.8 Looking at
the sciences themselves reveals that the laws governing such properties as
believing and desiring (or, for that matter, such properties as being a geolog-
ical plate) simply cannot be replaced with generalizations about lower-level
properties and constructions thereof (Fodor 1974). In fact, all we need here
is something somewhat weaker that what Fodor usually claims: we could
grant that there is some, albeit highly contorted, identity of belief with the
disjunction of its possible instantiators, but still insist that the unwieldy dis-
junction fails to capture the resemblances involved. (SeeAntony 2003.) From
the point of view of the lower-level properties, belief is a wildly gerryman-
dered aair. And so, from the point of view of the lower-level properties, be-
lief would be just as natural as any other equally-gerrymandered construct;
which is to say, not very natural at all. Indeed, you might even be able to
make a muchmore natural property by cutting o aleph-nought or so of the
disjuncts. Rather than such an extreme collapse of naturalness, we think it
more likely that properties of central philosophical interest will turn out to
be holistically natural, and not constructable in the manner Weatherson’s
account would require.
2.4 e incompatibility of (C) and (D)
e last argument we wish to oer is not, in fact, an argument to show that
one or the other of (C) and (D) is false, but rather that they cannot both
be true. In particular, although the analyst needs both (C) and (D), we will
argue here for the conditional: if (C), then not-(D).
Suppose that (C) is true. at means that how natural any given philo-
sophically important property X is depends on its correct analysis; in par-
ticular on the inherited and structural components of such an analysis. But
note that (C) will very likely apply again to the components themselves. How
natural each component of X (x1, x2, x3. . . ) is will depend on each of their
correct analyses. And of course how natural the components of each such
analysis will depend on their analyses . . . and so on, until we reach an exhaus-
tive analysis in terms of concepts of fundamentally natural properties. Only
at that point will the requisite comparison of naturalness be possible, since
only at that point will we truly be able to see what the inherited and struc-
tural contributions to its overall naturalness may be. But we take it that such
an exhaustive level of analysis is one that is far out of practical philosophical
reach, a fortiori out of reach of the armchair. Attempts to use a naturalness
8 AWeathersonian analysis can deal with a handful of very special things having this charac-
ter (e.g. truth;Weatherson 2003, 28). However, it can not accept the quantity of primitively
natural entities suggested by the Fodorian perspective. Bear in mind that lots and lots of
things might be primitively natural in this way.
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metasemantics to defend the armchair will have to thread a very tight needle
here: they need enough by way of constructability to motivate philosophical
analyses in the rst place, but not so much that the raw materials for such
constructions y completely beyond our seated grasp.
is problem can be illustrated by considering howWeathson’s analysis
of the naturalness of theories of knowledge interacts with his prime candi-
date for basic naturalness: physical fundamentality. As Weatherson writes:
I think we can dispense with [the claim that knowledge is primitively
natural] rather quickly. It would be surprising, to say the least, if
knowledge was a primitive relation. at X knows that p can hardly
be one of the foundational facts thatmake up the universe. If X knows
that p, this fact obtains in virtue of the obtaining of other facts. We
may not be able to tell exactly what these facts are in general, but
we have fairly strong opinions about whether they obtain or not in
a particular case.is is why we are prepared to say whether or not a
character knows something in a story, perhaps a philosophical story,
without being told exactly that. We see the facts in virtue of which
the character does, or does not, know this.is does not conclusively
show that knowledge is not a primitively natural property. Electrical
charge presumably is a primitively natural property, yet sometimeswe
can gure out the charge of an object by the behaviour of other ob-
jects. For example, if we know it is repulsed by several dierent neg-
atively charged things, it is probably negatively charged. But in these
cases it is clear our inference is from some facts to other facts that are
inductively implied, not to facts that are constituted by the facts we
know. (Only a rather unreformed positivist would say that charge is
constituted by repulsive behaviour.) And it does not at all feel that in
philosophical examples we are inductively (or abductively) inferring
whether the character knows that p. (Weatherson 2003, 22–23; italics
original)
We have already indicated one way in which this argument for (C) (at
least with regard to knowledge) might be insucient: if there are special-
science laws in which knowledge gures. (ere may also be other ways that
holistic naturalnessmay arise, such as thorough entrenchment in a folk prac-
tice.) But let us suppose, as Weatherson does here, that any sort of property
that occurs only in virtue of other properties’ occurring, is only natural in
virtue of its relation to those other, more natural properties. e problem
for Weatherson is that at least believes and justied are such properties as
well. Whatever naturalness they may have, they will only have in virtue of
whatever properties they can be analyzed in terms of. And so on. But once
our basic sense of naturalness runs out it will quickly become practically im-
possible to discern howmuch naturalness is possessed by dierent complex
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concepts.9
For example, it is unclear even that we can discern which of JTB and
JTB+ (i.e., JTBwith some additional Gettier-eliminating clause) ismore nat-
ural. One might have thought that that comparison would be as close to a
straightforward pairwise judgment as we are likely to nd between real com-
peting analyses in epistemology. Furthermore Weatherson takes it pretty
much for granted that JTB is the more natural of the two, and the operative
question for him becomes whether or not that increase in naturalness can
suciently oset the loss of matching up with our intuitions about Gettier
cases. Nonetheless, we contend that the complete analyses of JTB and JTB+
could well reveal the latter to be the more natural. For any nontrivial “+”,
JTB+ will be a stronger condition than JTB—everything that is JTB+ is also
JTB, but some things are JTB without being JTB+. But that means that the
total set of physical realizer states for JTB+ will be smaller than the total
set of physical realizer states for JTB.us, if it turns out that the ultimate
version of the analyses are vast sets of disjuncts, enumerating all the possi-
ble instantiations of JTB and JTB+, then there will be fewer disjuncts in the
analysis of JTB+. So JTB+ will be more natural, according to the factor of
logical complexity.
Alternatively, if a physical-fundamentality construal of (C) does not force
matters all the way down to sets of realizer states, that would seem to mean
that there are intermediate levels at which there is sucient holistic natu-
ralness to stop such a maximal analysis. But then we would face a dierent
challenge to (D): is there any reason to be condent that the analysis of JTB
would square better than JTB+ with such holistically natural intermediates?
It might be that some additional conditions will combine with justication,
belief, and/or truth in some way to produce a more natural property than
any of the JTB properties have for themselves. E.g., maybe beliefs produced
in accordwith the proper function of the agent’s belief-producing capacitieswill
prove more natural than just belief simpliciter. at is, perhaps the various
sorts of events and states of our neurological processes that occur when our
cognitive hardware is operating as designed by natural selection have more
in common with each other, than the whole set of events and states involved
in belief-producing processes do in general; and then perhaps this internal
similarity is sucient to render the property shared only by that subset of
9 By way of diagnosis, we suspect thatWeatherson’s account requires that two distinct meta-
physical issues run together: the supervenience of one property’s tokenings on the token-
ings of other properties, and the supervenience of one property’s naturalness on the nat-
uralness of others. Our objection is in part that a property can supervene on physically
more fundamental properties in the rst sense, without its naturalness doing so as well.
is may just be part and parcel of being a nonreductive physicalist, for example.
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beliefs a more natural property than beliefhood itself. Maybe; maybe not.
e devil will be in the details—and these details are not ones that can be
detected from the armchair.
3. Another path to loose constitutivity?
Given the inscrutable nature of the natural, one might wonder whether it is
the only way for a loose constitutivist to go, or whether some other method-
ological resource can be mustered to help select between candidate philo-
sophical theories.
Henry Jackman (forthcoming) oers one such approach, deploying the
principle of charity in an attempt to achieve the twin desiderata of loose con-
stitutivity.10 Philosophically undesirable sensitivities of the sort documented
by experimental philosophers are just something to be interpreted around,
without posing a threat to the interpretations themselves. Inter- and intrap-
ersonal diversity will still be consistent with a general convergence of best in-
terpretations of various persons and their timeslices (though Jackman does
acknowledge the possibility that Easterners and Westerners may, as would
be consistent with some recent experimental results, have divergent seman-
tics for their terms).
So far, so good—but it is only so far. We still have the same rough-and-
generic ratication problem that faced the naturalness-based account; so we
likewise must ask what may be appealed to in order to select between dier-
ent competitor theories.
Mere internal coherencewill not do.ere aremany dierent internally-
coherent stories that can be told about our intuitions, each onemaking sense
of a dierent pattern of attributions. All of the dierent epistemological the-
ories on oer are at least in the running, for starters. So how do we decide
what ‘knows’ means in the mouths of those who do not share Gettier intu-
itions, and whether it is the same as what it means in the mouths of those
who do? Our concern is that there will be, in Jackman’s Davidsonian frame-
work, no resources available from the armchair to answer that question.
For if we are to maximize not just internal coherence, but truth,11 then12
10ese desiderate are: rst, our intuitive applications of terms are part of what xes the
meaning of those terms (and so while we cannot be construed as wildly and across-the-
board wrong, yet at the same time some amount of error or confusion is surely to be en-
countered), second, acknowledging “noise” in our intuitions allows us to avoid massive
relativism about philosophical concepts.
11 or knowledge; see (Williamson 2008, ch. 8).
12 Jackman (personal communication) objects thatmaybe there really could not be rival com-
petitors that were all truly coherent, especially given strong weighting to our most central
commitments. We suspect that part of the problemmay be, however, that somany cases of
philosophical import are not really of much import to the speakers we are interpreting. So
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we will need to know what the truth is, in a way that will be decidedly un-
armchairish. Consider a ‘whale’-utterer. What contentwe should attribute to
them will depend very signicantly on what we take to be true about whales.
And, as our armchairs are (thankfully) not located on the poop deck of the
Pequod, we take it that very little indeed about whales can be discerned from
the armchair; we are better o consulting with biologists.
Moreover, even that might not be enough, if somehow it is granted that
substantial scientic knowledge is part of the armchair. Here is Davidson
himself on the limits of interpretation:
If a speaker utters the words, ‘ere’s a whale’, how do I know what
he means? Suppose there is an object that looks like a whale in the
ong, but I know it is not a mammal? ere seems to be no abso-
lutely denite set of criteria that determine that something is a whale.
Fortunately for the possibility of communication, there is no need to
force a decision. Having a language and knowing a good deal about
the world are only partially separable attainments, but interpretation
can proceed because we can accept any of a number of theories of
what a man means, provided we make compensating adjustments in
the beliefs we attribute to him. (Davidson 1980, 257; emphasis added)
For the purposes of communication, this degree of indeterminacy about
meaning may be absolutely ne; but for the purposes of philosophical anal-
ysis, it is a disaster. e reason that philosophers appeal to the sorts of in-
tuitions that they do is to pull apart the dierent theories about knowledge,
freedom, and so on—we take the philosophical truths to be determinate in a
way such that all these dierent theories are competitors.13 But it sounds as if,
given how subtle the dierences are between them, the principle of charity
may not license our preferencing one over the others. Perhaps some would
be happy to embrace the kind of quietism aboutmuch of contemporary epis-
temology and metaphysics that results—but that constitutes a more radical
alteration to philosophical theorizing than that aimed for by the experimen-
tal restrictionists!
Perhaps naturalness could come in through the back door here. For a
suciently large corpus, including also the deferential dispositions of the
speakers, the charitable reading might have to converge with the natural
reading, so long as the interpretee has any interest in and commitment to
carving nature at its joints. But such an approach obviously would run right
smack into the diculties we presented in §2.
there are cases that philosophers are leaning on heavily, but about which speakers really
are basically uncommitted. But Jackman may not be looking to defend such corners of
armchair practice.
13 We put aside current debates concerning the “merely verbal” nature of some philosophical
disputes. But see (Chalmers et al. 2009) for a discussion of these issues.
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Another possible response: Bealer argues that many concepts of philo-
sophical interest do not have scientic essences, but are “semantically stable”
(see Bealer 1999). e issues here are dierent from the one he is wrestling
with, but theremay be this similarity: maybe only armchair-accessible truths
are relevant for interpretation of concepts of philosophical interest. We think
this might be pretty unDavidsonian (but then again perhaps charity does be-
gin at home!), but it is not an obviously incoherent position. Such a move
however drastically reduces the amount of data that can be appealed to in
selecting one interpretation over another, with an attendent increase in the
degree of indeterminacy. Can this be compensated for by the generous use of
hypotheticals?at is, suppose we consider a large range of hypotheticals, in
each of which we just stipulate all the contingencies, and then see whether
interpretees do or do not extend their concepts? We could try that—but
then we’re back at putting all the weight on the intuitions! Such an outcome
would mean that, at worst, loose constitutivity does nothing to address the
restrictionist challenge; at best, we would still be in need of some further
armchair-accessible methodological resource for preferring one competitor
theory over another. And that’s a need that we have not yet found a way to
satisfy.
4. Conclusion
Loose constitutivity theories oer not just promisingmetasemantic accounts,
but also suggest an interesting line of response to the experimental restric-
tionist challenge. We oer no objections here to the rst aspect of such the-
ories, but have been concerned that, since they oer only rough and generic
ratication of our intuitions, it can only do methodological work for us if it
operates in conjunctionwith some sort of further criteria of theory selection.
We have considered two that we nd in the literature: naturalness (Weather-
son, borrowing from Lewis) and charity (Jackman, borrowing from David-
son), and both seem to have problems. If you’ve got an idea for another
candidate, please let us know.
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